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The Autonomy of the Contracting
Partners: An Argument for Heuristic
Contractarian Business Ethics Gjalt de Graaf
ABSTRACT. Due to the domain characteristics of
business ethics, a contractarian theory for business ethics
will need to be essentially different from the contract
model as it is applied to other domains. Much of the
current criticism of contractarian business ethics (CBE)
can be traced back to autonomy, one of its three
boundary conditions. After explaining why autonomy is
so important, this article considers the notion carefully vis
a` vis the contracting partners in the contractarian ap-
proaches in business ethics. Autonomy is too demanding a
condition for the realm of CBE. But a less stringent
version of the contract may be possible, a version which
uses the contract as a heuristic device, which merely re-
quires moral responsibility. Furthermore, it is argued that
views of (human) agency and the moral subject should be
made explicit in such a theory.
KEY WORDS: autonomy, contract Theory, contrac-
tarian business ethics, exit option, ISCT
Introduction
As the editors of this special issue rightly claim, social
contract theory is both a widely celebrated and oft-
criticized approach to business ethics. Much of the
criticism can be traced back to autonomy, labeled by
the guest editors of this special issue in their call for
papers as one of its three boundary conditions
(Heugens et al., 2004). Here, in four sections,
structured according to the use of the contract and
the contracting partners, I discuss what autonomy
means for contractarian business ethics (CBE). I ex-
plore how contract theories are repercussed by dif-
fering views of the moral agent. One of my primary
arguments is: Because of the domain characteristics of
business ethics, CBE will need to be essentially different
from the contract model as it is applied to other domains. In
order to discuss the use of the concept of ‘contract’
and the contracting partners, first we need to know
how contracts are used and who the contracting
partners are. Therefore, the approach in this paper is
to first distinguish three major interpretations in
current CBE and then make a distinction in the use
of the concept of ‘contract’ between constitutive and
heuristic contract notions. Next, I explore the con-
cept of ‘‘consent’’ in order to make the link between
it and the concept of ‘‘autonomy’’ in contract theory.
Surprisingly, we will discover, little attention has
been given to the notion of consent in CBE even
though, like autonomy, it plays a pivotal role. I will
also take a closer look at who the contracting partners
are: individual actors versus collective actors.
Contractarian business ethics
Three main traditions in contractarian business ethics
Before I discuss the concept of ‘autonomy’ in CBE
in this article, first it needs to be explained what
notion of CBE exactly I am talking about. Within
the social sciences, there are many different forms of
contractarianism. Not just between the different
disciplines however, also within business ethics
many interpretations of the contract model can be
found. Muel Kaptein and Johan Wempe on con-
tractarianism (2002, p. 184):
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These approaches differ with respect to the identified
contracting parties: the citizens in society, the partic-
ipants in the corporation and/or the corporation
itself ... Furthermore, there are differences with re-
spect to the character of the contract: hypothetical or
actual; discrete or relational; macro, meso, or micro;
procedural or substantive; relative or absolute.
Ben Wempe (2005, p. 114) contends that it is
slightly confusing that completely different and
mutually exclusive interpretations were ventured
under the label of a social contract for business. Ben
Wempe goes on to discuss what he considers the
three main positions in the tradition of CBE: macro-
contracts, micro-contracts and an integrated per-
spective (other contract-based doctrines for business
ethics include Anshen (1970) and Rogers et al.
(1995)). The macro-contracts position is presented
by Tom Donaldson (1982) in which a normative
framework is deduced so as to identify social
responsibilities in corporations. Of the three most
important traditions of CBE, this approach is the
most faithful to the classical political philosophers
like Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau: ‘‘Proceeding
from the idea that that there must be something like
norms for business, Donaldson seeks to derive these
norms in a manner analogous to the classical political
contract tradition.’’ (Wempe, 2005, p. 115). Micro-
contracts is a position presented Tom Dunfee
(1991), in which social contracts are interpreted as
‘‘Extant Social Contracts’’: the gradual emergence of
norms in various business sectors and communities.
The third position, and arguably the most influential
in current CBE, was jointly presented by Donaldson
and Dunfee in their book Ties that Bind (1999),
which can be seen as a synthesis of the earlier
deductive and inductive approaches.
Constitutive versus heuristic contractarian business ethics
Contracts, within and outside business ethics, are
often used to describe conventions that are ‘‘good’’
or ‘‘bad.’’ The content of such conventions is subject
to bargaining. ‘‘While conventions are not really
contracts, we can view this bargaining over mutually
advantageous conventions as the process by which a
community establishes its ‘social contract’’’ (Kymli-
cka, 1990, p. 127). The fact that we voluntarily
mutually agree to something is often used as a basis
for constituting morals. In this article, this is called the
constitutive device of the contract model; also called
the foundational argument. Such a use of the con-
tract model is the goal of a business ethicist like
Soule (2002), who is looking for managerial moral
strategies that have moral standing in the sense that
managers are morally obliged to follow them. Moral
strategies that fit within the integrated social contract
theory (ISCT) model (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994,
1999) are sought explicitly as a basis for normativity;
as a constitutive basis for hypernorms.
For the constitutive use of a contract, the concept
of consent is essential: the moral codes – however
derived or formulated, whatever their criteria – are
rational constraints consented to by autonomous
persons. After all, anyone who cannot be shown to
have (implicitly or explicitly) consented is not
morally bound by the contracts. Therefore, central
to the constitutive notion of contracts is that agents
voluntarily consent to the terms of certain agreements
(more on this later in this section).
Not all contractarians say they need the concept
of consent. In the twentieth century, when the
contract model made a revival after its introduction
by the early classical political contractarians, the
contract model was used as a basis for a theory of
social justice (Wempe, 2005). Rawls (1971), for
example, says people are ‘‘ends in themselves,’’
meaning they have a natural duty to treat others
fairly, which is not something they can consent to
but something they owe. As Kymlicka writes, ‘‘The
contract device helps us determine the content of
this natural duty, for it requires that each party take
into consideration the needs of others ‘as free and
equal beings’’’ (1990, p. 126). Here, according to
Kymlicka, instead of being sources of normativity (as
was the case with contracts as a constitutive device),
contracts express the content of the natural duty:
equal respect. Rawls (1971) conducts a thought
experiment to discover the meaning and content of
respect. To ensure that the contract gives equal
consideration to each contractor, Rawls’ position
abstracts from differences in talent and strength that
might create unequal bargaining power (Kymlicka,
1990, p. 126). In this position, the concept of
contract is differently used as in a constitutive use of
the concept for moral norms. A contract is used as
a heuristic device to determine what our natural
duties precisely are (based on equal respect).
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Contracturalism like Rawls1 does not use contracts
to establish obligations but as a heuristic device, that
is, contracts are used as fiction in order to make sense
of reality. The concept of contracts is not used as a
foundation of moral norms, but as a device to help to
determine the content of existing moral norms. Say
we choose ‘‘basic respect’’ – a concept whose
abstractness challenges its description – as our
existing moral norm. We then conduct thought
experiments in which the concept of contracts helps
to give ‘‘basic respect’’ concrete content.
Within business ethics, both heuristic and constit-
utive concepts of contract are used. However, within
much of CBE, for example in all the three main
traditions, contracts are used as constitutive of morals.
The ISCT model as developed by Donaldson and
Dunfee (1994, 1999), for instance, finds the justifica-
tion for the normative expectations of stakeholders vis
a` vis the corporation (and vice versa) in terms of actual
or tacit agreement. Soule (2002, p. 115) even calls the
ISCT model arguably the most prominent and
promising managerial moral strategy in all of business
ethics. Even though the three main traditions of CBE
are inspired by the classical social contract theories, the
moral norms are not derived in the exact same
manner, due to the specific domain of business ethics.
This leads to criticism as put forward by Ben Wempe
(2005, p. 119): ‘‘the main point is here that in both
versions of the macro-social contract actual norms of
corporate morality are derived with less precision than
the substantiation of principles carried out by earlier
contract theorists such as Hobbes and Kant and their
present day heirs, Gauthier en Rawls.’’
Consent
In the discussion above, the notion of consent was
introduced. The concept is important for CBE.
Early political contractarians (like Hobbes (1991)
and Locke (1988)), who introduced the contract
model in the seventeenth and eighteenth century to
argue the conditions for the legitimate exercise of
political power, realized that to claim a social con-
tract based on an argument, that assumes that a
contract was drawn in a state of nature that binds me
now – is not a strong argument (Hampsher-Monk,
1992). For this reason, they stressed the concept of
consent (Hampsher-Monk, 1992). Contracts (mod-
ern ones) create obligations only if people consent to
them. A hypothetical contract that no one consented
to is an empty concept unless it can be made clear
that people have implicitly consented to it. Hobbes
and Locke realized this, which is why Hobbes (1991)
found ‘‘explicit consent’’ – a soldier’s oath, for
instance – more valuable than ‘‘implicit consent.’’
And it is why Locke (1988) argued that ‘‘continual
consent’’ is necessary to legitimize government.
Locke (1988) made a distinction between ‘‘express
consent’’ and ‘‘tacit consent,’’ stating that the former
is necessary to establish government.
Autonomy
For the concept of consent, the concept of auton-
omy is vital: we can only consent if we have the
autonomy to do so. If we are forced into a contract,
we invalidate the concept of contract. Therefore,
autonomy is essential to the notion of constitutive
contractarianism. Donaldson and Dunfee acknowl-
edge this (1999, p. 38): ‘‘We begin by noting that at
the core of all contractarian approaches is the
acceptance of and respect for human autonomy’’. To
use contract theory as a foundation of normativity
(the constitutive device), we must assume that the
contractors willfully and freely bind themselves
(consent) to those contracts. If the act of contracting
is coerced, contract theory can hardly be a basis for
legitimizing normative claims. For constitutive
contractarians therefore, autonomy of the contract-
ing partners is crucial. Basic to constitutive CBE is
the idea of the moral subject, which can be held
responsible for autonomous choices. A moral and
autonomous person is then linked to the ability and
the authority to exercise rights and fulfill obligations
(Sevenhuijsen, 1998, p. 55). This aspect, though,
gets little attention within, for example, an influen-
tial constitutive model within CBE like the ISCT
model (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994, 1999).
Various definitions of autonomy can be given.
What is important here is self-governance, which
involves the existence of some sort of critical internal
capacities and the absence of external control (see
also Van Willigenburg, 2003; Schermer, 2001).
Even though within the philosophical literature the
exact definition of autonomy tends to differ from
scholar to scholar, ‘‘a realistic definition of autonomy
includes at least three conditions: (1) acting inten-
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tionally, (2) acting with understanding, and (3)
acting free of controlling influences’’ (Beauchamp,
1991, p. 386). The third condition, also known as
the freedom condition, is especially important.
Freedom is the core of every notion of autonomy
(Beauchamp, 1991, p. 387).
Individual versus collective actors
Up to now in this section, the different forms of CBE
were discussed, a distinction was made in the use of
the concept of ‘contract’ (constitutive versus heuristic
contract notions), and the concept of ‘consent’ and
‘autonomy’ were discussed and defined. Yet, the
following question is still not clear: just who are the
‘‘contracting parties’’? This, it turns out, is difficult to
answer. In the ISCT model of Donaldson and Dunfee
(1994, 1999) for example, the third main position in
CBE (Wempe, 2005) and arguably the most influ-
ential in the tradition of CBE, it often remains vague
who the contracting partners – the actors – exactly
are. It remains unclear what has to be expected from
whom – a serious problem.2 After all, in the ISCT
model the contracts are constitutive of obligations.
Donaldson and Dunfee (1999) do make it clear
that both individuals and collective actors, like
governmental organizations, can be seen as the
contracting partners. When they speak of collective
actors as contracting partners, the management of a
company is usually the decision-maker with respect
to entering into or declining a contract.
At first glance, the so-called macro-contracts in the
ISCT model seem to be explicitly between institutions
and society. Donaldson and Dunfee (1999, pp. 16/17):
At the heart of the social contract effort is a simple
assumption. Namely, that we can understand better
the obligations of key social institutions, such as
business or government. By attempting to understand
what is entailed in a fair agreement, or ‘‘contract’’
between those institutions and society also in the im-
plicit contracts that exist among different communi-
ties and institutions.
It seems clear here that, primarily, collectives are
considered the contracting parties. But things are not
that simple. Donaldson and Dunfee define macro-
contracts as ‘‘broad, hypothetical agreements among
rational people’’ (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999, p.
19). And people, as we know, are not organizations.
The hypernorms of Donaldson and Dunfee
(1999) sometimes seem to be based and legitimized
on something other than agreements: common
sense. Whether this is a valid approach is a separate
matter. It does raise the question, however, of why
the concept of contracts is relevant.
Just like the macro-contractors, the micro-contract-
ing actors can be both individuals and collectives
(Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999). Furthermore, some
micro-contracts comprise only collectives while
others comprise only individuals. While concrete
examples of micro-contracts are usually about indi-
viduals, Donaldson and Dunfee write: ‘‘The second,
or ‘extant’ contracts refer to non-hypothetical, actual
agreements existing within and among industries,
national economic systems, corporations, trade
associations, and so on’’ (Donaldson and Dunfee,
1999, p. 19).
A distinction between general social contract
theory and contract theory within the business
domain is that, within the latter, collectives can also
contract with other collectives. Organization is, after
all, specific to the business domain. I believe the
consequences of this specific context for contrac-
tarianism are not well worked out in the three main
traditions of CBE: Wempe (2005, p. 114) claims
‘‘Current CBE ... expects too much from the social
contract ... We need to pay proper attention to the
domain characteristics of business ethics and the
assumptions made by theoretical representations of
this field and consider how a social contract theory
needs to be set up so as to fit the questions and issues
central to business ethics.’’ How an individual is tied
to the morality of an organization (one of the main
research questions within business ethics) should be
taken into account. But this issue seems, for the most
part, ignored in the three main traditions of CBE.
Later in this article, I examine it more closely by
discussing the autonomy of the organization as op-
posed to that of the individual; claiming autonomy
for collective actors like an organization is plainly
different from claiming autonomy for people.
As was argued, the early political contractarians of
the seventeenth and eighteenth century used the
contract model to argue the positions for the legit-
imate exercise of political power; the twentieth
century political theorists used it as a basis for a
theory of social justice. Its use as a framework for
corporate morality thus constitutes an entirely new
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field of application (Wempe, 2005). Due to the
domain characteristics of business ethics, CBE will
need to be essentially different from the contract
model as it is applied to other domains. In the next
four sections, the discussion of possibilities of con-
tract theories within the business domain will re-
volve around the concept of autonomy. The
discussion of autonomy within CBE in these four
sections is structured by (a) the use of the contract
(constitutive versus heuristic) and (b) the contracting
partners (individual actors versus collective actors).
See Table I.
Individual autonomy and constitutive
contractarianism
Earlier I made the argument that autonomy is
essential for constitutive CBE. A problem with
regard to autonomy for constitutive CBE is that a
contract within the business context necessarily
involves uncertainties. This undermines the second
of the three mentioned conditions of autonomy:
acting with understanding. But also the first condi-
tion, acting intentionally, becomes suspect. This is
why Donaldson and Dunfee (1999) discuss the no-
tion of bounded moral rationality.3 But do they
solve the problem this way? How far does the
uncertainty in the understanding of the contractors
go? This is an important question because the less
understanding, the less the contract concept makes
sense.4 After all, if the uncertainty is too large, one
does not act with understanding anymore; the
concept of contract does not seem to describe any
more what goes on in reality (one of the conditions
for autonomy is not fulfilled), let alone be a sound
basis for moral norms. And the context of business is
such that contractors are often necessarily unaware of
many effects of their behavior. Unforeseen contin-
gencies could arise. Given the complexity of the
business context (and the unpredictable nature of
much technology), uncertainty abounds.
Within the concepts of ethical approaches, images
of human nature are expressed (Sevenhuijsen, 1998).
These images, in turn, express what it means to be a
moral subject, which, in constitutive CBE, is nec-
essarily autonomous, free and rational (since this is a
boundary condition). Recall that the freedom con-
dition is essential for any notion of autonomy, which
in turn is essential for constitutive CBE. The three
main traditions in CBE however, spend little time
defending this particular view of human nature, even
while this way of looking at moral subjects inher-
ently leads to a contractual view of society. Seven-
huijsen (1998, p. 55): ‘‘Kant links this, following
many other philosophers, with the idea of society as
a contract ... Being a moral person is thus, almost by
definition, linked to the ability and the authority to
exercise rights and fulfill obligations.’’ Meta-ethically
speaking, the constitutive contractarians’ autono-
mous moral subject – which needs many degrees of
freedom to autonomously enter into a contract – can
easily lead to a contract theory, and by default, open
up a discursive space for discussion of rights, justice,
and contracts.
The perspective of care ethics (Baier, 1985; Foot,
1972; Sevenhuijsen, 1998) gives rise to criticism of
the constitutive contract concept because of a dif-
ferent concept of the moral subject that is used.
According to care-ethics philosophers, the terms of
social cooperation are often unchosen. They main-
tain that many relationships – including those in
business – are simply not understood as contractual
relationships. Baier ‘‘rejects contractarian models
with their distinct emphasis on justice and rights,
because they omit integral virtues and place a pre-
mium on autonomous choice among free and equal
agents’’ (Beauchamp, 1991, p. 288). Care ethicists
prefer a moral subject who is embedded in concrete
relationships with other people ‘‘and who acquire an
individual moral identity through interactive pat-
terns of behavior, perceptions and interpretations’’
(Sevenhuijsen, 1998, p. 55). This different concept
of the moral subject – whether we agree with it or
not – may lead to different ethical theories.
Different philosophers, of course, have different
conceptions of moral subjects. Nietzsche’s (1989,
1990) moral person, for example, is determined by
social and cultural influences – a view of human
TABLE I
Possibilities for Contractarian Business Ethics
Constitutive Heuristic
Individuals
Institutions
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nature that differs from contractarianism. ‘‘Free-
dom’’, the third condition for autonomy, has so
different a meaning in his philosophy that contracts
seem a weird (if not impossible) notion to attach to
it. With Foucault (1977), we see a modern moral
subject as the product of societal power effects;
Kant’s autonomous moral subject is the effect of
disciplinary power-practices (Zwart, 1996). In a
panoptic regime, the individual is constituted into a
moral subject by disciplinary practices and normal-
izing discourses. Kantian subjects are the possibility
of existence for experience; for Foucault, experience
constitutes the subject (Zwart, 1996).
It is not my purpose to take a stand in this philo-
sophical debate, but to demonstrate that the moral
subject of contractarianism is not universally ac-
cepted, and that its consequences are not always well
thought out in the three main traditions of CBE. And
that when the philosophical discussion on autonomy
is considered within the business context, a person’s
degree of freedom becomes fuzzy: robust arguments
concerning social, economic, and natural forces
indicate that the roles people perform in a business
context largely determine their decisions and
behavior; they tend to act by rules determined by
society, as society expects them to act (de Graaf,
2003). This argument undermines the freedom
condition, the third condition for autonomy. Peo-
ple’s function within the organization gives them a
role in society. A good part of identity – and with it
the moral subject and its ability to judge and act in
freedom – is formed in specific social and cultural
situations (de Graaf, 2003). Since role pressure within
institutions is especially strong (Du Gay, 1996), the
freedom condition can be questioned and therefore
the autonomy of individuals within a business con-
text is not a given. March and Olsen (1989) point to
the effect of rules and how individuals within insti-
tutions are constrained by the construction and
elaboration of their meaning.5 Another argument
comes from the English social theorist Zygmunt
Bauman (1993). Along with the socialization aspect
that affects autonomy, Bauman (1993) mentions
another factor: the sociality of the crowd, that is,
individuals within an organization tend to show
group behavior.6 Neither socialization within com-
panies nor the sociality of the crowd yields to moral
autonomy. These arguments against the autonomy of
the contractors – the foundation of constitutive CBE
– land the theory on shaky ground.
Considering all this, does the autonomy concept
within the business domain make sense? I think not.
Even believers in the concept of moral autonomous
(bounded) rational individuals within the business do-
main must concede that individuals are bound in
various ways; their freedom is restricted. In that case,
does the contract concept make sense as a constit-
utive device for norms? Again, I think not. Indeed,
the concept of contract is not far removed from our
common sense, and could serve as a useful concept
in business ethics, more on this later. But that the
concept can serve as a way to constitute moral norms
in and among businesses is doubtful.7
Exit option and bargaining power
The number of contracts out there with explicit
consent is negligible. Some CBE scholars might
counter with, ‘‘Sure, maybe we don’t explicitly
consent to many contracts, but contract talk is largely
hypothetical.’’ Hampton is among those scholars’
many critics (1993, p. 381): ‘‘As Ronald Dworkin
puts it, ‘A hypothetical contract is not simply a pale
form of an actual contract; it is no contract at all.’’’
Others maintain that contracts are implicit agreements
in which the members ‘‘engage in certain acts
through which they give their ‘tacit’ consent’’
(Hampton, 1993, p. 381). This notion too has been
widely criticized. Again, it is not for me to join this
debate (see Hampton, 1993, for a good overview),
but to point out that implicit contracts must have a
notion of implicit (tacit) consent. And this intro-
duces the exit option because, without it, tacit
consent is untenable.
According to many contractarians (Hampsher-
Monk, 1992; Kymlicka, 1990), individual members
of any community must have the right to exercise
‘‘exit,’’ or the possibility of being ‘‘untied.’’ This
notion dates back to the origins of contract theory;
Hobbes (1991) and Locke (1988) consider it exten-
sively. Its reasoning is clear: a contract lacking explicit
consent constructs the possibility of implicit consent.
But, for the contracts to retain their moral legitimacy,
a safeguard must be installed, i.e., an exit. In other
words, any member unhappy with the outcome of a
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contract within a community can always leave that
community. Rawls (1971) avoids the issue of exit, by
imagining society as a closed system.
The exit option is not without its own problems
and criticism in political contract theory (see
Hampsher-Monk, 1992). Might it not be too facile a
notion, claiming that anyone who dislikes the laws
of a country can leave? It requires a strangely
atomistic view of individuals. People have bonds
with family and friends; a person’s identity is formed
within a cultural community. When a law or two is
not to their liking, personal immediacies generally
preclude their option to exit. That the notion even
occurs to them is doubtful.
Within the business context, the exit option is no
less problematic. Legitimizing the claim requires that
it be a moral foundation for all contractors, including
collectives. How the exit option should work for
institutions is not clear to me; explanations were not
found in the works of the three main traditions of
CBE (more on collectives in the next section). Here
again, and despite its importance, the business con-
text is not always well thought out in contract theory
in constitutive CBE.
Of course, for individuals the exit option works in
many contracts, explicit or implicit. Many in the
business context, however, position exits such that
one of the parties has little choice (e.g., see Keeley,
1988, on contracts of adhesion). For example, if
there is only one energy provider in the town where
I live, I do not have much choice whether or not to
accept its prizes. Another example is that it is always
an option for an individual to leave an organization
if she does not like its working climate. But this exit
option usually comes at great costs for individuals;
also other stakeholders are often not materially free
to leave organizations (Wempe, 2005, p. 130).
Among contracts, exit options generally surface
along a spectrum. At one extreme are contracts
where choice is viable; at the other is the contract
with a town’s monopolistic energy provider.8
The argument that many relationships in the
context of business are not between equals (because
of inequalities in power, money, authority, access to
resources, and so on) is fairly obvious. This, in turn,
affects an individual’s bargaining power in contract
negotiations. An agreement under coercion cannot
be used as a constitutive device – a problem for
constitutive CBE. Autonomy cannot exist alongside
coercion or manipulation. The employer’s power in
society raises the issue of violation of the freedom
condition of the employee’s autonomy. Provisions
could be installed, of course – in this case, ‘‘fair’’
contracts and voluntary consent. But then might not
the concept of contract and the understanding of
these social relationships become too far removed
from each other? Relationships are always unequal
to some degree, but are the inequalities in the
business domain so distinct that analysis in terms of
contracts becomes impractical? Using contracts to
constitute norms in business contexts for individuals
is problematic. As we have shown, the notion of
consent is specious. And since it is a prerequisite for
constitutive CBE, it jeopardizes its stance. Due to
the many business domain constraints discussed
earlier, and because of the inequality in business
domain relationships (especially with respect to
individuals), the exit option, in general, is a flawed
concept for constitutive CBE.
Collective autonomy and constitutive
contractarians
Our discussion has thus far focused on the autonomy
of individual contractors. But what about collectives,
which could, in both macro- and micro-contracts,
be the contracting partners? Since some contracts –
perhaps many contracts – within the business
domain have a collective–collective structure, a
closer look is warranted.
At the core of most theories in business ethics (de
Graaf, 2003, p. 34) that concentrate on studying moral
decisions is ‘‘methodological individualism,’’ which
states that behavior of an organization is reducible to
the behavior of the individuals that are members of the
organization. Generally, methodological individualism
is inclined to see moral phenomena as the aggregate
consequence of individual behavior. As a social theory,
methodological individualism has generally been dis-
credited because it fails to explain several social phe-
nomena within organizations. Many good arguments
predicated on economic, natural, or social forces, for
instance, can be presented to argue that institutions
(not in the sense of organizations or buildings, more in
a sense of collective ways of thinking, feeling, and
doing) determine, in large part, the decisions and
behavior of people (e.g., Foucault 1977). These are
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dynamics that transcend individuals. What managers
think, feel, intend, or want is not all-important because
the various supra-individual causalities have to be ta-
ken into account.
Organizations have their own dynamics
Within business ethics, a well-known problem is
that collectives do not automatically have autonomy.
The moral rules that classical ethical theories pre-
scribe can be used to advise individuals when making
decisions. But classic moral theories were not
designed for a corporate context (French, 1984, p.
xii) where, as noted, different levels of analysis are in
play. An important issue for business ethicists is thus
to decide how far they can go in applying philo-
sophical moral theories – meant for individuals – to
organizations. In the famous words of Velasquez
(1998):
Although we say that organizations ‘‘exist’’ and ‘‘act’’
like individuals, they obviously are not human indi-
viduals. Yet our moral categories are designed to
deal with individual humans who feel, reason, and
deliberate, and who act on the basis of their own
feelings, reasoning and deliberations.
According to Velasquez (1983), a corporation can-
not be held morally responsible. It does not have
autonomy. Velasquez is a so-called moral individu-
alist. To him intentionality is essentially tied to
consciousness. And the human kind of intentionality
is necessary for moral responsibility. A related
problem is how to punish organizations. Organiza-
tions cannot be put in jail and their souls cannot be
damned. Many business ethicists who believe that
organizations cannot be held responsible in a moral
sense spend their energy on individuals within
organizations, mostly the decision makers, i.e.,
managers (de Graaf, 2003). Interesting and wide
juridical and managerial literature exists on ‘‘who is
to blame.’’
At the core of the three main traditions of CBE
seems to be a moral individualism, with an emphasis
on bargaining among conflicting interests: When
making their claims on the moral legitimizing effect
(the foundation argument) of contracts, contractar-
ians like Donaldson and Dunfee (1999) mostly speak
of individuals, and refer to their (bounded) moral
rationality. In discussion of the latter, Donaldson and
Dunfee (1999), for example, only speak of human
beings and their intellectual and moral capacities.
This is understandable if we recall the importance of
autonomy for contractarians. And for autonomy,
acts must be intentional. But can organizations act
intentionally? There are some arguments in business
ethics that organizations can act intentionally whe-
ther or not it is seen as a human form of inten-
tionality. French (1984) for example, argues that
owing to the Corporate Internal Decision (CID)
structure, the corporation has its own intentions that
cannot be traced back to the intentions of individual
persons. But this argument does not get much sup-
port in business ethics (Kaptein and Wempe, 2002).
Organizations do not have minds, they are not hu-
man, and they certainly do not ‘‘think’’ like people.
They have their own dynamics, which cannot be
reduced to human metaphors. They ‘‘act,’’ but they
act in different ways.
Presenting all the arguments for and against the
existence of autonomy for collectives is unnecessary
here (see Kaptein and Wempe, 2002, chapter 3, for a
good overview). The point, however, should be
clear: CBE requires a stance in the debate. And
strangely, the three main traditions in CBE have
stood by moral individualism. Donaldson and
Dunfee (1999, p. 17) seem to try to avoid this issue:
The normative authority of any social contract de-
rives from the assumption that humans, acting ratio-
nally, consent – or at least consent hypothetically –
to the terms of a particular agreement affecting the
society or community of which they are a member.
Like the contracts in political theory, the moral
foundation of ISCT appears to be based solely on
autonomous rational individuals. Here, interestingly,
is no mention of collectives. It remains unclear
where Donaldson and Dunfee (1994, 1999) get their
normative authority for collectives to be autono-
mous contracting partners, which is especially
important in the business domain.
Third parties and moral authority
What about those that are affected by contracts to
which they are not a party? This deserves careful
consideration in contract theory within business
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ethics because the special domain of business ethics
comes to the fore. Organizations greatly modify our
natural and social environment, chemical pollution
being one of their obvious offenses. Organizations
direct a large chunk of people’s activities for a large
chunk of their lives. Technological innovations have
increased their impact (Mumford, 1970). Enormous
responsibility is embedded within these potent ef-
fects of organizations. The largest of them sometimes
affect the lives of countless people – in present and
future, locally or in broad swaths. But because these
actions may well not be exchanges, they are hard to
keep in the frame of contracts (Bauman 1993, p.
219).
Some third parties, like future generations or the
environment, do not have autonomy. Yet, this is
crucial to a contracting partner. This problem is typical
of any ethical theory that founds morals on reciprocity:
many relations are simply not reciprocal. And that espe-
cially applies to the domain of business ethics where
the impact of contracts on third parties tends to be
great. Reciprocity presupposes autonomy and
autonomy presupposes equality. Even if we could
defend autonomy for collectives, the problem – that
some parties are not at the table when decisions
affecting them are made – would remain. The
environment is never considered a ‘‘contractor’’ in
contractarianism. Environmental organizations,
perhaps, but who bestows upon them the moral right
to be the autonomous negotiator for others?
Donaldson and Dunfee (1994, 1999) introduce
hypernorms – in this case, broad social norms – to
resolve the third-parties problem. And of course, in
reality there are all kinds of laws within societies to
protect third parties; background institutions in lib-
eral democracies address many of the power/influ-
ence imbalance problems.9 Nevertheless, even with
the protection of hypernorms, affected third parties
can make moral claims, and it is not clear how
constitutive CBE can account for that. Provisions
can make, and do make, the inequalities less poi-
gnant than they appear at first. The problem for
constitutive CBE however, is that as long as the
contracts are within the hypernorms, laws tend to
eliminate third parties’ moral authority and status of
moral claims. Even though practical problems can be
alleviated, within constitutive CBE moral norms are
based on contracts between autonomous partners;
the third parties that are mentioned do not have
autonomy, thus undermining their moral status.
Constitutive CBE like ISCT makes the effects on
third parties look morally neutral, when they are
not. When undeserved harm is done, even unin-
tentionally, a victim can hold a company morally
responsible. The basis for this moral claim is not clear
in constitutive CBE. I maintain that contracts do not
apply to the moral ground for affected third parties,
regardless of autonomy.
Individual autonomy and heuristic
contractarianism
Here we focus on contractarians that use contracts as
a heuristic device, that is, contracts used as fiction in
order to make sense of reality. The concept of
contracts is not used as a foundation of moral norms,
as is the case within constitutive CBE, considered in
the previous two sections, but as device to help to
determine the content of existing moral norms. As
will be argued in this section, when using contracts as a
heuristic device, we do not need a strict notion of autonomy.
A notion of people having responsibilities could
suffice.10
We have demonstrated the dubiousness of
autonomy in previous sections; especially when
looking at the business domain, people and collec-
tives seem to be bound in many ways. But if there is
no autonomy, how about responsibility? Even
though Kant (2002) acknowledged that, in actual
behavior, we are subject to many determinants, he
supposed the freedom to direct our own actions as a
transcendental precondition of existence for ethics.
The so-called compatibilist position (Wolf, 1990)
states that autonomy is not required for responsibility
and whatever is required is compatible with deter-
minism. My hesitancy to acknowledge autonomy
does not mean that I deny the possibility of respon-
sibility. Normativity presupposes a certain type of free
choice. Even when determinism is true, and especially
in the business domain where constraints on the
agent are numerous, the position that the agent has
the freedom to do the right thing for the right reasons
is defensible. Even with a given identity– one we did
not choose – we can still acknowledge and subscribe
to our responsibilities. Let me explain.
In Freedom Within Reason, Susan Wolf (1990)
shows how it is possible for us to share reason
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without supposing autonomy. This argument is
similar to Van Willigenburg’s (2003). If our desires
are a result of heredity and environment, they come
from something external to us. ‘‘[T]he agent’s will is
not wholly or deeply her own because the content of
her will is completely determined by forces, people,
and events external to herself’’ (Wolf, 1990, p. 13).
For Wolf, the condition of autonomy seems
impossible but, she argues, autonomy is not neces-
sary for responsibility. She takes the so-called
‘‘Reason View.’’ The ability crucial to responsibility
is the ability to act in accordance with ‘‘Reason,’’
defined as the ability to do the right things for the
right reasons. As Wolf explains it (1990, p. 71):
According to the Autonomy View, having the status
of a responsible being depends on having distinctive
metaphysical power, the power to choose one path
of action or another independently of any forces that
would push us in one direction or the other.
According to the Reason View, having responsible
status depends rather on a distinctive intellectual
power, the power to exercise right Reason and to
govern one’s actions accordingly.
According to Wolf, we can be determined by both
the good and the past. The important point is that,
had we chosen to do so, we could have acted dif-
ferently.
Thus, rejecting the notion of autonomy does not
negate the notion of responsibility. I make choices –
sometimes bad ones – and you can hold me
responsible. According to Kant (2002), if there is
nothing that determines my choices, they are com-
pletely arbitrary and therefore are not choices at all.
Apart from the impossible position of metaphysical
autonomy, people reason and make choices. This
does not deny the influence of other forces. As we
saw in Wolf’s argument, some form of freedom is
possible if we suppose that people act according to
reason. The question then is, where does reason
come from? Let’s look at two possibilities.
Two examples of heuristic contract theories not needing
autonomy
The compatibilist position allows us to defend CBE
as a heuristic device. Heuristic CBE can help us to
understand how people work together in the busi-
ness domain. It can explain the content of social
norms (note: this is the difference with constitutive
CBE, where the contract concept is used to found
moral norms). People see reasons to bind themselves.
Despite the many forces influencing them, they can
think about their positions and subscribe to their
identities.
Defendants of heuristic CBE could argue, for
example, that people are utility maximizers. In such
case, self-interested people bind themselves to a
contract because they see reasons to. They subscribe
to it because they see the value of it. They act
because they think they can profit from it – some-
thing different from thinking it is the right thing to
do. But what about people who seem to act against
their own interests? Well, perhaps self-interested
people accept going against their own interests be-
cause they think they will gain from the contract in
the long run. Acts against their own interests thus
become acts of self-interest.
Not all contractarian business ethicists who argue
for contracts as a heuristic device need a view of
people as utility maximizers. There are other reasons
that people bind themselves to contracts. Susan Wolf
(1990) argues that the ‘‘Reason View’’ entails that
people are able to do the right thing for the right
reasons. In this view, people could bind themselves
when not personally gaining from it because they
think it is the right thing to do. They reason that
they are serving the notion of Good, their definition
of that notion notwithstanding. Contracts in business
ethics within this position could also be used as a
device to express the content of social norms.
The view that people act solely out of self-interest
seems unduly narrow. After all, people act out of
broader interests, too, like social ones. But perhaps
this view is also too limited. Both are teleological.
Scanlon (1998) would argue for yet another source
of reasoning: deontological. People act – or do not
act – according to notions of basic respect.
The origin of social norms
If social norms are not based on contracts as in con-
stitutive CBE, where do social norms come from in a
heuristic version of CBE? If we can answer that
question, we might have a more interesting story
than the hypernorms of ISCT. Here it was argued
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that when studying the concept of autonomy, the
business contractarians who use the contract as a
heuristic device seem to have the strongest position.
As they seem best able to avoid the many pitfalls of
autonomy; a notion of responsibility suffices. And the
latter is defensible even in the business domain. The
two types of teleological reasons for people to bind
themselves (described above) are compatible with the
Reason View, in which autonomy in a strict sense is
no longer necessary. Heuristic CBE could add to our
understanding as it offers to explain the contents of
social norms – in that sense the model has a distinct
value. But we should be cautious of the human
agency used in this model and the limits it brings to
explanatory content. Other representations of human
motivation enable adequate accounts of the business
domain, too, and advance our understanding of the
relationships of markets to other social phenomena
(Andersen, 2000, p. 200).
In Elizabeth Anderson’s (2000) interesting article
about social norms, she shows that Friedman’s advice
to economists – ignore empirical investigation of the
causes of human behavior and theorize on the
assumption that people behave ‘‘as if’’ they were
self-interested utility maximizers – was not a very
good one (Andersen 2000, p. 200). Rational choice
theory uses the model of homo economicus, which
explains conformity to social norms as the product of
strategic interactions of instrumental, rational, self-
interested individuals. As an alternative, Anderson
investigates models that use a homo sociologicus.
The model using homo sociologicus explains con-
formity of people to social norms in terms of the
normativity of norms, and grounds that normativity
in the ways individuals see norms as meaningfully
expressing their social identities, their relationships
to other people, or shared intentions and values
(Andersen, 2000, p. 171). These two explanatory
strategies are complementary, not mutually exclu-
sive.
According to Anderson and Gilbert, whose view
is shaped by showing people’s commitment to
organizational goals, gives an interesting account of
homo sociologicus. This comes close to Bauman’s
theory (1993), earlier discussed in this paper.
Andersen (2000, p. 191):
The great puzzle of social norms is not why people
obey them, even when it is not in their self-interest
to so. It is, how do shared standards of conduct ever
acquire their normativity to begin with? Once we
understand this, there is no further difficulty in
understanding the motive to obey them. We obey
them, because we believe that we ought to. We ac-
cept them as authoritative principles of action. This
is the guiding idea of homo sociologicus – that peo-
ple have ‘‘internalized’’ them.
People are recruited into organizational roles.
Gilbert (1992) defines a social norm as a principle of
action jointly accepted by a group. Andersen (2000,
p. 193) maintains that to regard people as being
jointly committed to a principle, is to regard each of
us as thereby having a reason to comply, and to
accept that everyone is accountable to everyone with
respect to compliance. The normativity or ‘‘ought-
ness’’ of social norms, then, is an ‘‘ought’’ constit-
utive of commitments of collective agency.
Furthermore Andersen (2000, pp. 194/195) claims,
Each of us is an individual, an ‘‘I’’ with, let us sup-
pose, an associated partial preference ordering. Each
of us is also typically a member of a church, a rela-
tive in a family, and so forth –each jointly commit-
ted to different goals, priorities, and principles of
action, representable in part by distinct partial prefer-
ence ordering ... Reason resolves conflicts among
these preference orderings not by weighing one pri-
ority against another, but by determining which
ranking, in the given context, has authority.
The views that people bind themselves to contracts
not because they are utility maximizers, but for the
sake of the Good (whatever they think that is) could
be a richer notion of the human agency and might
therefore help us to interesting insights (explanatory
models). According to Wolf (1990), being able to do
the right things for the right reasons allows us to do
Good. I agree, but with a caveat: the choices we
make are still along the lines of our identity. Even if
we can do Good, what determines our choices?
What determines the notion of Good? I argue that
having the faculty to make choices is compatible
with the possibility that those choices are made on
the bases of forces, people, and events external to the
choice-maker.11
This brings us back to the importance of the view
of human agency used in CBE. Only with a certain
rationalistic view of the subject do theories of con-
tracts make sense. The discussion in this section leads
Autonomy of Contracting Partners 357
to the conclusion that when defending such a view
and basing heuristic CBE on it, the underlying
assumptions of the theory, and the fact that no view
of human nature is morally neutral, should not be
forgotten. According to Hampton (1993, pp. 387/
388), Kantian contractarians, including Rawls, have
been criticized because they have not convincingly
demonstrated that their contractarian theory pro-
vides a justified ‘‘Archimedean point,’’ a ‘‘morally
pure’’ starting point.12
The view that people bind themselves to contract
not because they are utility maximizers but for the
sake of the Good has a strong notion of rationality in
individual behavior. Even though we can reason, can
decide to act according to our reasons, and can
subscribe to social norms and our identity, the
question remains: Can social norms be explained
that way? If so, does the rationalistic view most
accurately describe and explain them? Phenomena
could also be explained with less rationalistic views
of human agency, which does not necessarily make
them irrational. For example, people act according
to their identity and match their behavior to the
situation. People internalize local norms that fit their
identity in the local situation. Here we encounter
the emotional facets of relationships, those influ-
enced by traditions, power, or cultural perceptions.
This is a notion different from choice and individual
freedom. With such a view of human agency,
contract theory, even heuristic CBE, is less valuable
in that it does not provide us with all possible in-
sights.
In sum, contracts used as heuristic devices can
have value for business ethics. Such thinking does
not require a concept of autonomy. A concept of
responsibility could be compatible with the con-
straints on the agent in the business domain. But it is
imperative to consider which concept of human
agency heuristic CBE uses, for that is the only way
to be aware of the limits of its explanations.
Collective autonomy and heuristic
contractarians
Much of the discussion on individuals and the
heuristic CBE applies to collectives. While recalling
that autonomy is necessary for constitutive CBE and
that autonomy of collectives is highly questionable,
also recall the defense that strict autonomy is not
necessary for CBE as a heuristic device. As with
individuals, this opens up possibilities for CBE with
collectives as contractors. And, as with individuals,
autonomy can be excluded from the idea of
responsibility. Thus I stand by the notion that, even
if collectives do not have autonomy, they can be
ascribed moral responsibility for their actions.
The Reason View can also be applied to collectives.
As noted, collectives’ actions have impact. I agree with
Wilmot’s idea (2001, p. 165) that the intention of a
corporate act need not reflect the intentions of any
individual or group within the corporation. Wilmot
(2001, p. 165): ‘‘Organizations differ from other non-
persons in that they can have powers of reasoning
attributable to them, along with reasoned choices as to
how they pursue their allotted purpose, even though
they cannot choose what purpose that shall be.’’ This
allows organizations to have a degree of responsibility.
As mentioned earlier, Peter French (1984) is a notable
example of a philosopher who made a strong
argument in favor of corporate moral intentionality
(though he later seemed to back away from his
argument).
Is intentionality essential to responsibility? The
answer is important. While corporations are capable
of doing considerable undeserved harm, it is usually
the case that it was unintentional (at least, according
to most traditional moral theories that specify the
behavior within human intentionality). Our orga-
nizations are complex: division of labor and exper-
tize renders most employees’ actions molecular parts
of the whole, leading to problems of intentionality
within business ethics. Bauman (1993, p. 18): ‘‘Sin
without sinners, crime without criminals, guilt
without culprits! Responsibility for the outcome is,
so to speak, floating, nowhere finding its natural
haven.’’ Some argue that whether an organization’s
intentionality is seen as a human form or not is
superfluous – but not very convincingly (Kaptein
and Wempe, 2002). Most cases of organizations
(agents), for example, causing environmental pollu-
tion are clearly unintentional, and thus do not satisfy
the intentionality condition contained in moral
responsibility. I am convinced that our ordinary
(daily) moral discourse – where the fact that harm is
done is more important than the intentionality
condition – ‘‘casts a considerably wider net’’ than
those business ethicists who defend moral individu-
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alism.13 It is therefore more appropriate. Whatever
their intentions – when a company’s ‘‘escaped’’
cloud of poisonous gas carries with it a significant
death toll, or when a company’s ‘‘leaked’’ oil dev-
astates an entire ecosystem, or when a company’s
‘‘employment’’ of poorer populations involves
servile wages – I maintain that the company is
morally responsible.
In sum, collectives can be held responsible with-
out autonomy and, for argument’s sake, can be
considered tacit contractors. Thus, possibilities for
heuristic CBE with collective contracting partners
exist without the concept of autonomy.
Conclusion
As was argued in this paper, the early political
contractarians of the seventeenth and eighteenth
century used the contract model to argue the posi-
tions for the legitimate exercise of political power;
the twentieth century political theorists used it as a
basis for a theory of social justice. Its use as a
framework for corporate morality thus constitutes an
entirely new field of application (Wempe, 2005).
Due to the domain characteristics of business ethics,
CBE will need to be essentially different from the
contract model as it is applied to other domains.
After examining the concept of autonomy with re-
spect to CBE in this paper, conclusions can be
summarized (Table II).
A constitutive model for moral norms based on
contract theory is hard to defend in business ethics
because the necessary concepts of autonomy and
consent, in the business domain, are highly prob-
lematic, both for individuals within companies and
the companies themselves. But there are possibilities
for CBE using a heuristic contract device because
autonomy is not necessary – moral responsibility is
enough. Some alternative origins of social norms,
needed for such a heuristic device, were discussed in
this paper. The particular view of agency however,
used in these theories must be considered because it
determines (and thereby limits) the possibilities of
such a heuristic model. Too often, views on agency
and moral subject are (implicitly) assumed to be
universally accepted when they are not. Only within
certain (rationalistic) views on agency and the moral
subject can CBE make sense. A heuristic CBE must
also make clear the consequences of treating col-
lective actors as moral agents.
Notes
1 Van Willigenburg (2003), who will be later dis-
cussed in this article, seems to be on the same side of
contracturalism as Rawls: he does not use contracts to
establish obligations.
2 Which is why many of the current reviews of
Donaldson and Dunfee (1999) urge them to become
more specific about their hypernorms. Wempe (2005,
p. 127) disagrees and believes that ISCT provides far
too concrete moral norms for corporations.
3 I will resist the temptation to conclude that this
means, for their contractarian model, that they also need
the concept of ‘‘bounded autonomy.’’
4 In this light, even the heuristic use of the concept
becomes suspect. More on this later.
5 Individuals within organizations do not seem to act
on the basis of rational calculation. They act, according
to March and Olsen, on the basis of rules, simple rules
about their tasks within organizations. In other words,
they act like they are supposed to act. Individual judg-
ments require experience-sharing and collective deliber-
ation; they depend on shared practices. ‘‘Self-fulfillment
and even the working out of personal identity and a
sense of orientation in the world depends upon a com-
munal enterprise ... Outside a linguistic community of
shared practices, there would be biological homo sapi-
ens as logical abstraction, but there could not be human
beings’’ (Sullivan, cited in: Kymlicka, 1990). This is
especially the case of individual identities within organi-
zations. Individuals form their identities within organi-
zations. ‘‘In particular, it should be noted that the
values and preferences of political actors are not exoge-
nous to political institutions, but develop within those
institutions’’ (March and Olsen 1989, p. 40). The same
goes for business organizations. Values of managers are
not formed in their consciences. Both their identities as
managers and their conscience are formed in the sociali-
zation process within an institution. This leaves little
room for an autonomous, ‘‘bounded’’ rational individ-
TABLE II
Possibilities for Contractarian Business Ethics
Constitutive Heuristic
Individuals Problematic Possibilities
Institutions Problematic Possibilities
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ual. ‘‘Not only do individuals modify perceptions to
accommodate preferences, they also modify their prefer-
ences to accommodate their perceptions’’ (March and
Olsen 1989, p. 40).
6 Managers’ ethical judgments at work are different
from those in their personal lives. In a crowd, what to
do is no longer the problem; they do what others do:
‘‘Not because what they do is sensible, beautiful or right
or because they say so, or because you think so – but
because they do it’’ (Bauman, 1993, p. 132). The effect
of crowd behavior on morality is the same as the sociali-
zation of individuals: behavior in organizations takes the
place of the autonomy of the moral self.
7 Sure, we could still describe the rule-behavior
within organizations that March, Olsen, and Bauman
speak of in terms of contracts. ‘‘But socialization into a
set of rules and acceptance of their appropriateness is
ordinarily not a case of entering into an explicit con-
tract. Rules ... are constructed and elaborated through
an exploration of the nature of things, of self-concep-
tions, and of institutional and personal images’’ (March
and Olsen, 1989, pp. 22/23).
8 The empirical examples given in reference to the
exit option by Donaldson and Dunfee (1999) are always
about individuals, like lawyers who resign from the
American Bar Association (Donaldson and Dunfee,
1999, p. 42). Donaldson and Dunfee agree that this exit
is often a ‘dramatic’ option. But they argue that moral-
ity should not be costless. However, not resigning from
the American Bar Association is also a moral choice.
After all: ‘‘engaging in a practice is sufficient to imply
consent’’ (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999, p. 263). And
this is relatively costless! So, engaging in an existing
practice is a moral choice, yet staying within the
boundaries of the status quo is usually much less painless
than the exit option. In that sense, the drama of the exit
option is not so much a moral foundation for contract
theory; it is more a foundation of the moral status quo.
9 Think of institutions like codes of corporate gover-
nance (empowering shareholders vis a` vis managers);
employee representation (empowering employees vis a`
vis managers); consumer representative organizations
(empowering consumers vis a` vis corporations); and, in-
deed, organizations speaking out for ‘‘third parties,’’
such as fair trade organizations, human rights organiza-
tions, etc.
10 As claimed by Kymlicka (1990, p. 126) in the
beginning of this paper, Rawls (1971) seems to agree.
11 Furthermore, I define Good as a correspondent of
social norms (de Graaf, 2003). Norms are not transcen-
dental; they are social, local (de Graaf, 2003). This
non-rationalistic view seems incompatible with the
Reason View and, in that sense, is an alternative for using
heuristic contract theory to explain the normativity of
social norms. Hub Zwart (1996, p. 33): ‘‘There is a basic
fact of which history informs us, namely that the ‘reason-
able’ individual, free and equal, and the willing to accept
‘fair terms of cooperation’ had to be produced by force.’’
12 Hampton (1993, p. 388) maintains that feminist
philosophers criticize Rawls’ theory on the same basis
when they argue that Rawls’ assumption that individuals
in his so-called ‘original position’ are self-interested is
motivated by institutions about what counts as a plausi-
ble ‘‘weak’’ psychology that is in fact derived from a,
according to them, discredited Hobbesian view of hu-
man nature.
13 French used this expression when making a similar
argument during the Business Ethics Conference, Washing-
ton DC, August 3, 2001.
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